Japan Braces for Diplomatic Shifts After Trump's Midterm Loss
With APEC leaders meeting in Shenzhen, Tokyo fears a weakened president will trade Indo-Pacific interests for a quick foreign policy win.
By Hiroshi Ferrari ·
Tokyo is preparing for a potential shift in Washington’s priorities as US President Donald Trump faces a weakened domestic position following last week's midterm elections. With the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit scheduled for November 18 and 19 in Shenzhen, Japanese officials are watching closely for signs that the White House may pursue a diplomatic quick win with China. This move could come at the expense of allies in the region.
The anxiety in Japan stems from the results of the November 3 election, which left the administration reeling. In response, Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio in Paris on Monday during the G7 foreign ministers' meeting. A joint statement issued after their talks noted that both nations agreed to "further advance security cooperation to strengthen the deterrence and response capabilities of the Japan-U.S. Alliance." The two sides also pledged to "maintain close communication" regarding the Indo-Pacific situation.
Sebastian Maslow, a professor of politics at The University of Tokyo, argues that a president who is a "lame duck" in domestic politics may use his remaining authority to focus on foreign policy. He warns that a deal between the US and China could give President Xi Jinping the leverage to intensify pressure on Japan. This dynamic places Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in a difficult position, forcing a reassessment of how Tokyo handles its relationship with Beijing.
Margarita Estévez-Abe, an associate professor at Syracuse University, describes the current US approach as transactional. She notes that Trump previously called US arms sales to Taiwan "a good negotiating chip with China." Tokyo is also frustrated that the White House has not intervened in the dispute over rare earth export restrictions imposed by China after Takaichi’s comments on Taiwan. The Trump administration has effectively treated the conflict as a bilateral issue between Tokyo and Beijing.
The uncertainty extends to other regional threats. Estévez-Abe points out that while the US-Japan alliance remains intact, Trump's outreach to Moscow and Pyongyang worries Tokyo. She emphasizes that the US relies on Japan as its primary military base in the Indo-Pacific, meaning Washington has a strategic interest in not emboldening Russia and North Korea against its ally.
To mitigate these risks, Japan has diversified its security partnerships over the past decade. Tokyo has stepped up defense cooperation with the European Union and NATO, forged a quasi-alliance with Australia, and joined minilateral frameworks with the Philippines. Maslow notes that while these steps aim to give Japan more autonomy, the country lacks a "plan B" if the US alliance unravels.
With two years remaining in Trump's term, Tokyo hopes for stability. Estévez-Abe suggests Japan is waiting for a new administration that might be "strategically more amenable." Maslow counters that hope is not a strategy. He urges Tokyo to protect the alliance by increasing defense spending and safeguarding its economic security.
