Iran Maintains NPT Commitment While Hardliners Push for Nuclear Shift
Tehran asserts its continued adherence to the non-proliferation treaty even as it restricts inspections and debates a change in nuclear doctrine following recent military strikes.
By Larissa Bell ·
Iran has officially stated that it has not suspended its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, despite ongoing tensions with the United States. As mediated negotiations continue to seek an end to the conflict, broad international inspections of Iranian nuclear sites remain distant. The delay in inspections follows significant US and Israeli attacks on Iran’s primary nuclear facilities and the assassinations of several senior leaders, events that have intensified discussions within Iranian authorities about potentially abandoning the treaty to build a nuclear weapon.
The rhetoric from hardliners in Tehran has grown bolder in recent months. These officials have demanded a shift in the country’s nuclear doctrine, a stance that marks a departure from the policy established under the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had officially forbidden the possession of nuclear weapons. US President Donald Trump’s threats to target the underground Pickaxe Mountain complex near the Natanz facility and other sensitive locations have further encouraged this hardline perspective.
During a press conference in Tehran on Monday, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei reaffirmed the Islamic Republic’s commitment to the NPT. He acknowledged, however, that cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, has been restricted. Baghaei noted that conditions imposed by other parties, specifically the attacks by the US and Israel, have created complications in implementing safeguards. He stated that as long as this situation persists, Iran cannot engage with the agency as it would under normal circumstances. The spokesman also renewed Tehran’s criticism of IAEA Director Rafael Grossi, while confirming that new inspections were conducted at the Bushehr nuclear power plant just days prior.
The Bushehr plant, constructed with Russian cooperation, remains the only facility currently accessible to the IAEA because it was not directly bombed during the war. Although US warplanes attacked the perimeter of the plant several times, causing damage and prompting a partial evacuation of Russian personnel, the facility itself was spared direct hits. Those Russian workers have yet to fully return to the site. In late October, Grossi told the UN Security Council that the agency could not verify Iran’s nuclear material because Tehran had not provided the necessary information and access.
Ali Vaez, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the International Crisis Group, described Iran’s current stance as keeping one foot inside the NPT while the other hovers near the exit. He told Al Jazeera that allowing inspections at Bushehr is a low-cost gesture intended to keep diplomacy alive and manage hardliner demands. This strategy preserves Iran’s leverage over the critical underground nuclear sites, including Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian, a visiting researcher at Princeton University and former Iranian nuclear negotiator, explained that Iran’s position distinguishes between honoring NPT commitments and permitting inspections of damaged facilities. He noted that the IAEA lacks an established protocol for inspecting nuclear sites that have suffered military attacks. Mousavian added that Iranian officials fear that granting the IAEA access to sensitive locations could result in information being shared with the US and Israel, which might then be utilized in future strikes. Consequently, Tehran views these restrictions as a security concern rather than a rejection of its treaty obligations.
Iran’s nuclear program is governed by the NPT, which establishes rules against proliferation while recognizing the right to peaceful nuclear energy. A separate safeguards agreement with the IAEA outlines how the agency monitors these activities. As a party to the treaty, Iran is allowed peaceful nuclear exchanges and development assistance, provided it does not acquire nuclear weapons and accepts safeguards. Withdrawal from the NPT requires a formal notice after a determination that extraordinary events have jeopardized the country’s supreme interests. However, the treaty does not protect against conventional military attacks, a gap that domestic hardliners frequently cite.
Calls to leave the NPT are not limited to a small group of hawks. Iran’s security chief Mohsen Rezaei has publicly discussed the possibility of abandoning the treaty on multiple occasions. Earlier this week, Hossein Mohebbi, spokesman for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, stated that the organization would create the necessary preparations if the Islamic Republic decided to change its nuclear doctrine.
Regional mediators, including Qatar and Pakistan, continue to relay messages between Iran and the US to prevent another all-out war, though analysts warn that escalation is likely in the coming months. Tehran has maintained that it will not allow its highly enriched uranium to leave the country but remains open to downblending it under international supervision within Iran. It has also said it will not abandon enrichment entirely but can accept limits, similar to the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal that Trump unilaterally abandoned in 2018.
A comprehensive deal addressing Iran’s nuclear program would also require a resolution to hostilities in the Strait of Hormuz, which is unlikely in the near future. Vaez suggested that Tehran might be willing to make small concessions in exchange for tangible American benefits, but it is unlikely to surrender its most valuable bargaining chips immediately. He noted that a preliminary deal could unlock limited, phased inspections based on the 2025 Cairo agreement between Iran and the IAEA. That agreement, which came after the 12-day war of June 2025, envisaged restored access to all Iranian facilities with case-by-case permission from the Supreme National Security Council. However, it was never enforced and was followed by renewed attacks on February 28. Mousavian argued that Tehran would require a comprehensive agreement addressing overall security and nuclear issues before agreeing to inspections of the bombed sites.
